A 51-year-old female patient with Guillain-Barré syndrome was given three times the intended dose of intravenous human immunoglobulin while admitted to a tertiary intensive care unit. The error went unnoticed for seven hours and appears to have been the result of several successive breakdowns in communication between key staff. The patient, fortunately, made a full recovery.
A 51-year-old female inpatient was given three times the intended dose of intravenous human immunoglobulin. This mistake was not recognised for seven hours. At least 20 well-intentioned and capable staff members were involved in a series of 11 communication failures. How this can be prevented from recurring is discussed.
CASE HISTORY
The patient was admitted to the neurology service of a tertiary referral hospital with suspected Guillain-Barré syndrome. On day two she was transferred to the intensive care unit (ICU) for closer observation due to concerns regarding her respiratory function. The neurology service remained her primary bed-card unit. In the ICU the patient was commenced on intravenous human immunoglobulin at a dose of 30 g daily, for five days, by instruction of the neurology service to be prescribed by ICU medical staff. Review of her chart by the neurology service on the following morning indicated she had been given 150 g of immunoglobulin over a six-hour period -five times the intended daily dose. The neurology and ICU teams informed the patient, documented the incident in the medical record and completed an incident report, which was subsequently discussed at the weekly ICU morbidity and mortality meeting and at the hospital's quality and safety committee.
Immunoglobulin therapy was ceased and the haematology service was consulted regarding the risk of coagulopathy. The patient's condition did not deteriorate. She was discharged from the ICU to the ward on day five where she continued to improve. She was discharged home on day eight with the expectation of a full recovery. Having made a full recovery, the patient provided full verbal consent for her de-identified case to be discussed in a professional publication.
ANALYSIS
This case provides the opportunity to learn from a 'near miss' 1 . The case demonstrates that, despite our best efforts, a patient can be overdosed on intravenous medication in the ICU of a major Australian teaching hospital. In this case, the error was not noticed for roughly seven hours. It is fortunate, albeit irrelevant, that an overdose of intravenous human immunoglobulin does not usually carry serious consequences.
There is clear evidence demonstrating the relationship between multiple system errors, breakdowns in communication and adverse patient events 2 . This case highlights that relationship.
It is clear from the outset that this incident was not one person's fault. Based on discussion with the staff involved, it appears that from the time the patient was admitted to the neurology service until the time it was realised that she had been overdosed At no stage do either the medical or nursing notes document the specifics of the treatment plan. In this instance, the ICU notes are ambiguous (i.e. does this mean 5 days of 'Intragam' or 5 doses given over an unspecified timeframe?).
Too little information/ content error.
Day 2, 1100 hours
The nursing notes from the neurology service on day 2 state "…For transfer to ICU… To commence Intragam when arrives (for 5 days -30 g)".
The nursing notes are similarly ambiguous and potentially misleading. By documenting only partial information and omitting key information (such as the frequency of administration and duration of treatment), the medical record ceases to be a safe means of inter-professional communication.
Omission/too little information/content error.
When it was decided to start the patient on intravenous immunoglobulin (in the ICU), the neurology resident documented five separate orders for "IVIG 30 g" on the ward drug chart, all dated on the same date and charted that it be administered "APP".
APP is not a widely accepted acronym on drug charts 4 . APP was most likely intended to mean 'as per protocol', as is sometimes the case in the ICU, but could mean 'as per plan'. The use of acronyms is acceptable if it can be assured (not assumed) that all involved in their use have a shared understanding of their meaning.
Wrong action right object/too little information/content error.
Day 2, 1200 hours
The ICU resident who admitted the patient to the ICU directly transcribed the IVIG order to the ICU drug chart from the neurology resident's order on the ward drug chart. The order was for five separate 30 g IVIG doses, but all dated on the same date.
The administration schedule was documented as "APP".
The neurology service was the primary bed-card unit but they did not document the treatment plan in the medical record. The ICU team began treatment of the patient according to a plan that was not clearly documented. The result is a medical record and a treatment plan that is ambiguous and open to interpretation. While ambiguity exists for all staff, the purpose of documenting a management plan is to reduce ambiguity for those charged with implementation.
Repeated error/ cognitive elements of human error.
The ICU admission notes state in the plan "IV Ig as per neurology service".
This entry and the following entry demonstrate the diffusion of responsibility 5 between the ICU and the neurology service. The implication of these entries is that both teams thought that the other team was in control of implementing the plan. The evening ICU round noted that the patient was "stable" and that the plan was to "continue IV Ig and discharge to ward tomorrow if patient remains stable".
This suggests that the ICU staff considered their role as one of monitoring a neurology patient who would be returned to the neurology ward as soon as they were able.
Wrong action right object/too little information/cognitive and content error.
Day 2, 1930 hours
The nursing notes, following the evening ICU round state that "all general care attended. Intragam 30 g X 2 given so far".
This entry suggests that the nursing staff responsible for actually administering the immunoglobulin did not understand the treatment plan.
Wrong action right object/cognitive error.
Day 3, 0400 hours
The night ICU round notes state that the patient "is on IV Intragam".
This entry suggests that the night ICU medical team did not understand the treatment plan, though it is unclear if the night medical staff observed exactly how much immunoglobulin the patient had been given. There were seemingly no documented concerns with the progress of the patient's treatment, despite the fact that by 0400 hours, she had been given at least twice the intended daily amount.
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DISCUSSION
The analysis in Table 1 indicates a diffusion of responsibility 5 by the treating teams, in that neither team took adequate responsibility for documenting and implementing the intended treatment plan.
The key factors that led to the patient being overdosed were breakdowns in written and verbal communication and junior medical staff who did not fully understand their role.
The reasons why the neurology service did not document the entire plan in more detail before their patient was transferred to ICU, or why the ICU team did not question ambiguous notes is not clear. Perhaps the plan seemed 'too simple' to warrant detailed documentation? Perhaps junior staff did not feel that they could ask an obvious question? Perhaps no-one noticed that the plan had not been written down, due to the inevitably busy workload of staff in a tertiary hospital? There is no clear explanation.
What is clear, however, is that junior medical staff from both the neurology service and the ICU were charged with implementing a plan that they seemingly did not fully understand. That plan was, therefore, not clearly communicated to the ICU nursing staff. That successive breakdown in communication and subsequent propagation of error resulted in the patient being given at least three times the intended dose of intravenous immunoglobulin.
Situations like this are common in modern healthcare 6 . Indeed, mistakes are an inevitable part of practising medicine in a dynamic and time-pressured environment 7 . The important question now is, how can this be prevented from happening again?
In general, the medical profession is poor at ensuring that all members of a treating team know and understand not only the what of a plan but also the how to 8, 9 . One solution that might help in preventing an event such as this from occurring in the future is the adoption of a more uniform approach to note-taking and medical record keeping, in conjunction with a robust and formal orientation program for junior medical staff 10 . Standardised frameworks for documentation of information are built into the daily routine of other industries, most notably the military, aviation industry and emergency services 11 . However, the use of such frameworks is an uncommon practice in medicine. Historically, the rigour applied to medical note-taking and verbal handover has been left to the individual practitioner, rather than being embedded as a formalised process within the structures of the workplace 11 .
The communication failures outlined in Table 1 can be summarised as follows: the management plan was not clearly documented. That initial lack of clarity was not questioned in the early phases of its implementation. As such, errors made in implementing the ambiguous plan were carried over by multiple personnel.
Communication failures such as these are more common when documentation and clinical handover is poor or when junior staff members do not understand their seniors' intent 12 . There are several recognised formats designed to reduce communication breakdown.
SBAR is an acronym that originates in the US Navy submarine service. It stands for situation, background, assessment and recommendation. It was developed to allow easy, efficient and safe communication between junior crew and senior officers during extended day/night operations. It has since been adopted by several health services in the US as a way for junior nursing and medical When blood products are administered in this institution, they must be recorded on both the drug chart and the fluid balance chart because they affect volume status. The amount signed for, as being administered on the drug chart should equal the amount recorded on the fluid balance chart. The disparity between the drug chart, the fluid balance chart and the blood bank record meant that it was not possible for the neurology service or the ICU team to be sure of the exact amount of immunoglobulin that had actually been administered. There were no surplus bottles of Octagam™, so it is reasonable to assume that the patient received the 90 g released by the blood bank and that errors were made in documenting the dose administered on the ICU drug and fluid charts.
staff to communicate clinical information to on-call consultants 13, 14 . In this case, an adapted acronym, SBAP (situation, background, assessment, plan), could be utilised by medical staff to convey clinical information and the medical plan in a written format. This may have resulted in a more clearly documented plan by specifically directing the assessing doctor to write one down. However, while acronyms can assist trained staff members to minimise error and mitigate risk, they would not have solved this problem. The crux of this communication failure is that junior medical staff members were not adequately trained to make complex decisions or implement unusual plans in an intensive care environment. At the time of this incident, a formal orientation program for residents commencing terms in the ICU did not exist. The first day of a new term served as a form of ad hoc orientation and was, therefore, variable in its quality and comprehensiveness. ICUs are unlike other areas of medical practice. While residents from the medical or surgical ward can transport general principles of patient care into the ICU, the specifics of daily practice and the demands of the ICU patient are, by definition, more intense. As a result the consequences of error are more serious. The likelihood of error occurring is heightened when new staff members are not trained to perform their new job 13 .
Since this incident, a formal orientation program is conducted for residents in the first week of a new term and an orientation pack with common information and tasks is provided to them during the orientation program. This orientation includes specific instruction on appropriate prescribing and fluid ordering in the ICU. The overarching theme of this orientation program is one of seeking help and clarification of instructions early.
In summary, this case highlights the need to remedy a significant failure in the lines of communication both within and between treating teams in order to avoid similar events of this nature occurring in the future. It provides a unique opportunity to revisit concepts of patient safety and explore new ways to further increase the quality of healthcare provided by tertiary ICUs. The solutions may be applicable to other clinical environments.
Furthermore, this case demonstrates the role of regular and open clinical audit in ICUs to highlight misunderstandings and communication deficits early. This case may demonstrate the need to adequately orient new clinical staff to the specifics of their new job, particularly in an intensive care environment.
CONCLUSION
Successive failures in communication both between and within treating teams led to the overdose of this patient. More research needs to be conducted into effective ways of improving written and verbal communication, within an intensive care or other clinical setting, if such failures are to be avoided in the future.
